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Abstract 
In this study facility siting of an existing ammonia-urea complex is evaluated based on risk 
analysis. A number of critical process units of the plant are selected as the sources of toxic 
release and overpressure. Locations of control room and two operators’ shelters are considered 
with respect to four critical units. The consequences due to toxic release and blast overpressure 
are modeled for various worst case scenarios developed in critical units. Both structural damage 
and human mortality/injury are converted into risk factors and locations with minimum risk 
factors within plant area are identified for the probable siting of the control room and operators’ 
shelters. The findings are compared with the existing layout of the ammonia-urea complex 
considered. 
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1. Introduction 
The major accident in the history of chemical industry of Bangladesh occurred in June, 1991 in a 
urea fertilizer factory. About 50 people in and near the control room were affected and 7 of total 
11 died on spot. Although the accident was caused by faulty welding of a column, the location 
and safety features of the control room were the key factors that lead to the fatality. Bangladesh 
is an agro-based country and currently, seven fertilizer factories are producing approximately 2.5 
million tons of urea per year. To ensure food security and improve nutritional status the 
government of Bangladesh is planning to build new energy efficient factories in near future.  A 
safe facility siting plan is critical for ensuring safe operation and growth of these plants.  
The present study is aimed at exploring safe options of facility siting in an ammonia-urea 
fertilizer plant. The study is based on the methodology developed by Jung (2010) and adopted by 
Rahman et al. (2014) and utilizes their concept of QRA to determine combined risk scores due to 
toxic release and vapor cloud explosion for an existing ammonia-urea plant. Three main units of 
ammonia plant, namely, the primary reformer, secondary reformer and the ammonia converter 
and the urea converter of the urea plant have been considered for accidental release. The layout 
of the existing ammonia-urea plant is used to identify safe locations for control room and 
operators’ shelters. 
2. Methodology  
Figure 1 shows the steps followed for the quantification of risk and risk mapping of the plant. At 
first the accident scenarios were set. In this study rupture of vessel is considered to be the leading 
causes of accidents. The scenarios considered are: 
 Rupture of ammonia converter 
 Rupture of primary reformer 
 Rupture of secondary reformer 
 Rupture of urea synthesis reactor 
These units are chosen based on their operating conditions and reported accident frequencies 
(Rahman et al., 2014). In each of these units, toxic release of ammonia and blast over pressure 
for vapor cloud explosion (VCE) due to hydrogen are considered. 
 
 
Figure 1: Steps used for risk quantification and risk mapping 
After selection of accident scenario, realistic accidents are considered with worst outcomes. The 
ruptures are considered to be of the size of holes of the largest pipe entering or exiting a unit. In 
order to incorporate the worst case scenario it is assumed that entire content within the unit is 
released upon the rupture within 10 minutes. The wind speed was considered to be 1.5 m/s 
(Crowl and Louvar, 2011). From the data available for annual average temperature, the ambient 
temperature is considered to be 32 . The relative humidity is considered to be 50%. The 
substances released are considered to be at the exit temperature of each unit. 
Dispersion of gas due to leakage or rupture in process equipments generally depends on wind 
speed, wind direction, atmospheric stability, ground conditions, and height of the release above 
the ground level, momentum and buoyancy of the initial material released. As the wind speed 
increases, the plume becomes longer and narrower. Consequently, the substance is carried 












of Risk and Risk 
Mapping 
Step 4 
In this study ALOHA is used for modeling the accidental release. One of the significant factors 
highlighted in this study is the wind direction. Wind directions are considered to be north-west 
and south-east based on annual wind directions in consequence modeling. At first, the amount of 
release occurring is expressed either in the form of concentration or blast overpressure. The 
concentration/blast overpressure at a certain distance from the origin of source is determined for 
the toxic release/VCE. Next, the concentrations and overpressures are converted into probit 
functions to determine probability of death. In case of toxic release, the probit function used for 
ammonia is,  
Pr= -28.33 + 2.27 (ln(C
1.36 
* t))  
Here, C is concentration in ppm and t is time in minutes (Q. Consultant, 2010). 
Unlike toxic release or potential fire hazards, persons who are exposed to overpressures have no 
time to react or take shelters. Thus, time does not enter into the hazard relationship. Work by the 
Health and Safety Executive, UK, has produced a probit relationship based on peak overpressure. 
This probit equation has the following form (HSE, 2011)  
Pr= 1.47 + 1.37 (ln(P)) 
Where, p = peak overpressure, psig  
The above probit values were then converted into Risk Scores. Risk Score is the probability of 
toxic release or structural damage in the entire lifetime of the plant and is expressed as follows 
(Jung, 2010; Jung et al., 2010): 
Risk Score = Pr × Frequency of occurrence × Lifetime of plant × weighing factor  
The lifetime of the plant was considered 20 years and the weighing factor was taken 100.  Table 
1 presents the frequencies of occurrence of different accidents (GHD, 2009; HSE, 2012; P. 
Consultant, 2011) considered in this study.  
Table 1: Frequency of occurrences  
Process Unit Type of Worst Case Scenario Frequency (Leak/yr) 
Ammonia Converter 




Toxic Release of Ammonia 
Primary Reformer Blast Overpressure due to VCE 2.05 X 10
-3
 








Toxic Release of Ammonia 
 
3. Case Study: Evaluation of  Facility Siting of an Existing Ammonia-Urea Plant 
The ammonia-urea complex under consideration resides in Chittagong, Bangladesh. Figure 2 
shows the current locations of four major units and three facilities in a simplified plot plan of the 
complex. The major units that have been considered in this study are, namely, the ammonia 
converter, primary reformer, secondary reformer and the urea synthesis reactor. The objective is 
to evaluate whether the facilities, such as, control room or operators’ shelters are safely sited 
with respect to the major units mentioned above. In the existing layout, the ammonia and urea 
plant share a common control room located at the south-east part of the complex outside of the 
processing area. There are three operators’ shelters in the plant. The first and second shelters 
reside within the plant area.  The third one is situated at the north-east part of the complex 
outside of the plant area. The location of the plant experiences annual wind mainly from north-
west and south-east directions. 
 
Figure 2: Simplified plot plan of the ammonia-urea complex showing major units and facilities 
For the present study, the plant area is divided into 10 by 20 grids. Each grid is of a square of 10 
meters on each side. Figure 3 shows the estimated risk scores for different grids. The combined 
risk scores vary from 0.6 to 3.5. From the trend of the risk score values, it is noted that both wind 
velocity and direction are key contributors to the risk scores. The relatively high risk scores 
along north-west and south-east directions of the four units reflect this effect of wind.  
 
Figure 3: Estimated risk scores of ammonia-urea plant 
In the existing layout, the control room is at the south-east corner of the complex. When wind 
comes from the north-west direction, the present location of the control room is susceptible to 
higher risk of release compared to any other locations north to it. Figure 3 also shows that the 
location of operators’ shelter 3 is in high risk zone due to the same reason, i.e. it is at the south-
east corner of the urea plant and susceptible to north-west wind flow. The risk map also shows 
that the lowest risk scores are obtained along the north boundary of the ammonia plant.   
Figure 4 shows suggestions for safe locations for the facilities based on the estimated risk scores. 
While operator’s shelter-2 and operator’s shelter-3 have safe locations in present layout, moving 
the operator’s shelter-1 upward towards the north boundary would place it in a relatively low risk 
zone compared to the current location. There are two alternative suggestions for the location of 
control room. Considering the high risk scores at the south-east part of the layout, a safer 
position for the control room would be at the top right i.e. north-east corner of the complex 
compared to the present south-east location.  One the other hand, the existence of relatively safe 
zone between the urea and ammonia plant at the north boundary is of great interest from both 
design and operational perspectives. Since the control room is shared by both urea and ammonia 
plants, locating this room between the two plants along the north boundary will reduce the cost 
of wiring and piping significantly as well as make operators’ movement to and from plant sites 
convenient. 
 
Figure 4: Suggested locations for control room and operators’ shelter -1 
 
4. Conclusion 
An approach to determine safe locations for the facilities of an ammonia-urea complex is 
presented here. The effect of accidental release from four major units on the surrounding plant 
area is expressed in terms of combined risk scores. Based on the relative values of the risk scores 
inferences are drawn regarding the safe siting of facilities including control room and three 
operators’ shelters. It is found that the wind direction play a critical role in determining safe 
locations in the plant area. 
It is to be noted that the exact value of risk scores are very much sensitive to the considered 
accident scenarios as well as used consequence model, probit function and frequency. The 
present study gives an estimate of the risk scores for an ammonia-urea plant that would be useful 
for further study and comparison purpose.  
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